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Abstract: 
Roads policing has been described as “the public face of the police” for many citizens (Corbett, 
2008a:131), but fails to excite much criminological interest. This is despite the fact that vehicle use is 
the most likely generator of an adverse-outcome encounter between the general public and the police 
(Corbett 2008b:13) and is therefore one of the most likely situations in which individuals are 
confronted with their own ‘law-abidingness’ or lack of it. The paper will propose that the concepts of 
‘risk’ (as a political as well as sociological concept) and ‘acceleration’ (of technological change, as well 
as everyday life) can be used to explain the controversial and apparently unsettling image of roads 
policing in recent years. This paper reflects on how speeding offences (researched between 2002-
2006) and mobile phone use by drivers (researched between 2013-2016) reveal much about how 
drivers see themselves, their priorities, and the law. 
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Introduction:  
It is frequently observed that societies appear able to accept high levels of road death and injury 
(Corbett, 2003:27) – levels that would produce uproar if caused in some other way. It is possible that 
we are able to tolerate a certain amount of ‘collateral damage’ in exchange for the freedom offered by 
personal mobility (Johnson, et al., 2014:28). Alternatively, it may be that we are unwilling to condemn 
others for behaviour we engage in ourselves and which -‘but for the grace of God’- would see us 
change place with the offender (Plowden, 1971:368), or that we believe that we are better than the 
average driver so it will never happen to us (Delhomme 1991; Svenson, 1981). Perhaps it is significant 
that the frequent, yet dispersed, nature of road deaths sees their attenuation in the media (Anderson, 
2006), preventing them from getting their rightful (actuarially conceived) place on society’s risk radar. 
If the reality of actual road death and injury fails to excite much interest, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
attempts to take action against common behaviours that sometimes increase the chances of it 
happening have met with resistance (Wells, 2012).  Given that driving licenses and road crashes are 
both ubiquitous in contemporary societies, road traffic law is a particularly apt focus for exploring the 
crimes of ordinary, ‘law-abiding’ people.  
This paper concerns itself with two forms of behaviour that are both pervasive and against road traffic 
law. The first, breaking the speed limit, has been proscribed by law in some form since 1861. It occurs 
when an individual drives a motorised vehicle at more than the miles-per-hour limit set for that stretch 
of road and is premised on the logic that the faster a vehicle is driven, the less time the driver has to 
react to danger, and the more damage is done if and when they collide with something else. Whilst it 
is impossible to know how many times this offence is committed (Snow, 2015:159), it has been 
detected millions of times over the last 15 years on UK roads, with recent increases being made 
possible following the introduction of automated speed cameras (Home Office, 2016a). The second 
offence with which this paper is concerned is the use of a hand-held mobile phone while driving. Part 
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of the Road Traffic Act since 2003, the law is premised on the logic that ‘using’- that is holding, and 
communicating via - a mobile telephone will increase a driver’s reaction time, make it more likely that 
they will fail to react sufficiently quickly to changing circumstances, and therefore be more likely to 
cause harm. It is an offence detected by a human traffic officer who observes that the phone is ‘in 
use’, and is an offence that has been prosecuted around 1.2 million times since December 2003 (Home 
Office, 2016b).  
Whilst both offences may sound relatively simple, whilst the underlying logic is seemingly apparent, 
and whilst campaigns to communicate that logic have been both emotive and persistent, the 
enforcement of both has been complex and the behaviours seem somewhat entrenched. Although we 
would not expect that something as simple as the creation of a law would be sufficient to see a 
behaviour cease, we propose that there is ‘something about’ the type of person to which they apply, 
and ‘something about’ contemporary society that means that the existence of these laws is only a 
small part of the story. Furthermore, there is ‘something about’ the targeting of these laws on the act 
of driving in contemporary society that sees those laws take a back-seat to a range of other pressures 
that, seemingly, make the illegal actions worth committing. This paper therefore considers two recent 
attempts to reduce the numbers of road deaths and injuries recorded in the UK by tackling, at an 
aggregate level, driver behaviours that are shown to increase the likelihood of a crash occurring at an 
individual level. These two offences form particularly good examples of where the ‘crimes of the law-
abiding’, whilst often perceived as minor, can frequently result in injury and, on occasion, death. 
 
Risk, acceleration and identity 
The continued existence of, and response to, the offences of speeding and mobile phone use whilst 
driving, can be usefully understood, we suggest, through viewing them as symptomatic of life in 
postmodernity. Below, we draw on the concepts of risk and of acceleration to more fully understand 
what enforcement against these offences means for the identities of those experiencing it. Risk 
provides both the explanation for the existence of the law, and a framework for understanding 
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reactions to it, whilst employing the concept of acceleration reinforces the importance of situating 
analysis within an understanding the post-modern condition and the challenges of contemporary life. 
Both concepts suggest a generalised sense of uncertainty - of instability and of insecurity - which 
speeding and mobile phone use while driving may appear to help alleviate in the short term.  
Both of the laws on which this discussion focuses are attempts at preventative action following the 
demonstrated association between a behaviour and a harmful outcome – of ‘risk’. Indeed an 
increasing tendency to think in risk terms, even to the extent that we might consider ourselves to live 
in a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) can be seen to be at the heart of many of the issues with these types of 
offences and has been identified as an emerging theme of the policing of the roads (PACTS, 2005). 
Firstly, conceptualising problems in ‘risk’ terms means that we are talking about the probability of 
something harmful happening, not a guarantee that it will happen. This means that false positives are 
inevitable, and these are the offences that end up in fixed penalties for speeding or mobile phone use, 
and in drivers attending educational courses for both offences. They therefore punish individuals for 
apparently disproving the promoted causal relationship between the behaviour and the outcome. 
Risk, as a justification for enforcement in the roads policing context, does not (indeed need not) 
concern itself with issues such as motivation, prior record, or mitigation and, for this reason, brings 
whole new populations (previously unused to being conceptualised as ‘the problem’) within the 
enforcement gaze, many of which may feel that they offended unintentionally, or with good cause 
(Wells, 2007). Previous research has noted that the self-proclaimed ‘law-abiding’ and respectable 
identity of drivers subject to speed limit enforcement – and challenged by a new focus on riskiness 
rather than intent - has been a major factor in their sense that the enforcement was unfair and 
unjustified (Wells, 2007, 2008). Whilst it may have been the case that we could assume that law 
“provide the necessary architecture in which people can plan and carry out good-faith social 
cooperation” (Luban, 2002:296) and that being law-abiding would allow us to live without interference 
from legal authorities, this is no longer the case when a concern with risk (rather than morality) 
dictates what is legal and illegal, what attracts censure and what does not.  
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Giddens has suggested that, within a risk society, the maintenance of an individual’s ‘protective 
cocoon’ relies on their ability to construct and defend a reasonably coherent ‘narrative of self-identity’ 
(Giddens, 1991:54). However, freed from the burden of inherited identity, identity itself becomes 
more fluid, requiring constant reaffirmation and reconstruction in an effort to stave off a sense of 
ontological insecurity (Giddens, 1991; Mythen, 2005, Jenkins, 2008). If our status in respect of the law 
is more contingent than previously, then so are other elements of our identity such as where we live, 
who we live with, and who we work for – all of which become more temporary (Castel, 2000) and 
more subject to continued consideration and evaluation. Reference points for identity, such as job 
role, marital status, community, are increasingly experienced as fluid and are the products of choice  
rather than chance, bringing with them certain freedoms, but also the possibility of making the wrong 
choice. A wrong choice in such circumstances may mean the difference between success and failure 
on a variety of measures. In such circumstances Bauman suggests, the question “’[h]ave I used my 
means to the best advantage?’ is the consumer’s most haunting, insomnia-causing question.” 
(Bauman, 2000: 63). 
Beck suggests that changes in the nature of employment in recent decades, for example, have led to a 
requirement that all employees are both flexible and mobile, able to respond to changes in demands 
placed upon them, or otherwise be replaced by other more flexible and mobile individuals (Beck, 
1992:94).  Failure to adapt is, furthermore, transformed into a personal failing reflecting badly on the 
individual who could not keep up, rather than on a system that made him or her expendable (ibid:89). 
Total flexibility, adaptability, and mobility can therefore be seen as prerequisites for wage earning, and 
in turn for participation in consumer markets, for purchasing goods and services; for active citizenship 
(Rose, 2000: 190). However, the possibility of unemployment and issues surrounding job insecurity 
also impact negatively on an individual’s relationships and home life, with longer working hours and 
increased work effort required (Nolan et al., 2000). With relationships already characterised by 
increased fluidity (Rosa, 2013), such pressures may add to the stress experienced within the home and 
between friends and family members.  
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Maintaining attractiveness and competitiveness – one’s ‘viability’ as a ‘human resource’ (Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997: 197) - becomes a constant pressure, and one that does not dissipate when one gets 
behind the wheel of a car. The pressure to perform is not simply experienced within the traditionally 
recognised ‘workplace’ but follows individuals everywhere (Wajcman, 2015). Getting from place to 
place quickly, or maintaining contact with others whilst moving from place to place become significant 
concerns in what Rosa has characterised as the ‘acceleration society’ (Rosa, 2013: 160). Rosa writes 
that the apparently exponentially increasing pace of life creates a world of increasing fluidity where 
time flows faster, relationships are increasingly transient and we experience a “contraction of the 
present” where familiar reference points from the past are quickly rendered irrelevant (Rosa, 
2013:157). For him we are all constantly seeking to climb "slippery slopes" (Rosa, 2003:11), ever 
conscious of the potential for imminent descent and the loss of what we have worked for. Under such 
circumstances, the risk of failing to achieve or decelerating becomes apparently more ‘real’ and 
perceptible than, for example, the risk of a collision or being caught committing a traffic offence. In 
this sense technological developments such as the car and the mobile phone are both a blessing and a 
burden, and effective functioning requires the negotiation of a careful path whereby their benefits are 
experienced but their threats avoided. Indeed Rosa and Scheuerman (2009:5) highlight that the 
process of acceleration as a concept can be attributed to the “profound effects of the acceleration in 
transportation and communication” over recent centuries, making driving, speed and mobile phone 
use particularly apt cases studies.  
 
Speed, mobile phone use and the law 
The action of pressing the accelerator or answering the phone is an action woven through with 
concerns about acceleration. Time spent driving is increasingly being seen as time that can (also) be 
used for other purposes, and technological developments such as mobile devices contribute to the 
idea that we should be able to do everything on the move as we “pursue novel, purportedly time-
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saving technological devices in order to tackle the imperatives of an increasingly hectic everyday life.” 
(Rosa and Scheuerman, 2009:24).  
Speeding apparently has obvious (if perhaps routinely overestimated – Fuller et al, 2009) benefits 
within a society plagued by a “scarcity of time” (Rosa and Scheuerman, 2009:15). It appears to allow a 
driver to reach a destination sooner, potentially providing an individual with additional time to 
perform any of a number of activities that the accelerated society requires for us to maintain our 
current position (Rosa, 2003). In the case of speeding, time pressures are routinely offered as reasons 
for why drivers speed (Alonso et al., 2013; Hatfield and Soames Job, 2006; Kanellaidis et al., 1995). 
When a traffic jam inflicts involuntary ‘deceleration’ on a driver, the use of a mobile phone may 
become even more appealing as a method of keeping upright on the “slippery slope” of an accelerated 
society (Rosa, 1999). If time spent driving (or queuing) cannot be avoided, then it may be tempting to 
look for ways to make it work for us – to liberate “wasted time” (Lyons & Urry, 2005) that would 
otherwise be lost to that activity on arrival at the destination and to avoid ‘slipping back’ domestically, 
socially and professionally, even whilst we are prevented from progressing physically. 
Our phones offer us a means to reduce an array of pressures. We can not only phone or text, but we 
can virtually replicate our office environment with email, progress our social life via updates to social 
media, reclaim lost time for leisure activities by watching films, and complete necessary domestic 
tasks such as shopping and banking. The ubiquity of ‘stuff’ installed in or enabled by connectors and 
adapters is a clear message from car manufacturers: ‘look what else you can get done while you are 
driving! (You can keep in touch, you can be entertained, you can do business, you can organise your 
life)’. 
Furthermore, the laws that regulate drivers behaviour are similarly striving to ‘keep up’ with the reality 
to which they need to apply. Common arguments against the legitimacy of speed limits have included 
the idea that the law is outdated and that cars now have better brakes than when the law was 
introduced; that modern cars won’t ‘go’ at 30mph in 5
th
 gear; and that (since the speeding aspect of 
the research reported here took place) cars are now routinely fitted with a variety of devices that 
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claim to make a crash virtually impossible (AAA Foundation, 2014). In the case of mobile phone use, 
despite being a much more recent law, it is clear that the core terms of the legislation (‘mobile phone’ 
and ‘use’ and even, potentially ‘driving’) have become unrecognisable. A law passed in 2003 would 
have conceptualised a mobile phone as a device held in the hand, on which the user could talk, text, 
and perhaps take pictures. As such, the ways in which you can ‘use’ a ‘mobile phone’ as described in 
the law would predate smart phone technology that essentially recreates the home computer and 
home entertainment system in a hand-held device. Beyond this then come the range of other gadgets 
that may now be a feature of our cars, such as satellite navigation systems, driver-assisting 
technologies, and Bluetooth hands-free kits, not to mention wearable technologies, such as Google 
glass(es), iWatches, smart fitness trackers and the like – devices that are not technically ‘phones’, are 
arguably as distracting, but had not even been imagined when the law was devised.  Even the concept 
of ‘driving’ is now one that is challenged by the development of various types of ‘driver assist’ 
technology and (increasingly) by the stages of technological development leading to the fulfilment of 
the concept of the driverless car. As such, the laws that drivers are asked to abide by are increasingly 
removed from the risk that they were designed to reduce, so even if a driver were able to identify 
what behaviour qualified them as ‘law-abiding’ and adhere to it, it is not clear that this is in the spirit 
of the legislation as passed, nor that it would keep them safe.  
As Rosa notes it is technological development that has given us greater speeds, better and more 
mobile communication, but also many of the novel risks associated with the sheer pace of change 
within contemporary society (Rosa, 2013). This is mirrored by Beck’s concept of manufactured risk, 
produced by the very technologies that were the success stories of modernity (Beck, 1992). Within the 
roads environment, developing vehicles and the technologies embedded within them allow for faster 
movements and multi-tasking, both of which enhance the ability to accelerate, to progress, to achieve 
greater productivity. Given the instability noted above on the employment and domestic fronts, these 
may increasingly appear not just attractive, but potentially necessary, if we are to continue to compete 
with the other insecure, uncertain, pressured individuals with whom we make up ‘traffic’.  
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Methodologies 
The empirical data relating to speed limit enforcement that follows is drawn from a project (‘project 
1’) conducted at the height of the speed camera debate which sought to explore the views of drivers 
about their experience of speed limit enforcement by speed camera. Data were gathered via focus 
groups with drivers with different driving biographies (convicted drivers, new drivers, experienced 
drivers, professional drivers) – categories that had emerged as significant from the earlier Internet-
based research. All participants gave their fully informed consent and were asked to discuss their 
feelings about speed limit enforcement generally. This was supplemented by non-participant overt 
observation of 20 sessions of a Speed Awareness Course, where course attendees were aware that 
agreement to be observed as part of the research in no way impacted upon the outcome of their case. 
Full details of this methodology can be found in Wells (2012). 
The data relating to the enforcement of mobile phones whilst driving is drawn from a research project 
(‘project 2’) exploring driver and police perceptions of mobile phone use whilst driving and methods of 
attempting to reduce the behaviour. As well as a longitudinal survey element (not reported here) nine 
interviews were conducted with drivers experiencing education as an alternative to prosecution 
(‘detected drivers’) and 19 with those experiencing the same education as part of their employee’s 
training provision (‘employees’). They were conducted between four and six weeks following 
attendance at that course and only where the participants had emailed the researcher indicating 
interest in partaking in an interview. No change in outcome in terms of the charged offence resulted 
from participating in an interview. Thirteen further interviews were conducted with police officers 
having some experience of stopping drivers for mobile phone offences. Again, interviews only took 
place with those who indicated interest in the research following an invitation to take part. 
The data obtained from both projects were analysed using an inductive thematic analysis approach 
whereby the research concepts and literatures were drawn from the analyses of the data gathered 
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(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Quotes have been selected on the grounds that they most appropriately 
capture the themes raised in the projects as a whole.  
 
Law versus law-abidingness: losing a sense of direction? 
Whilst, presumably, few drivers intend to be deliberately dangerous (perhaps believing they are not 
causing danger, or not being fully conversant of the links between actions and harms) the law is 
actually not a very good guide to what behaviour is least dangerous in these cases. The two contexts 
explored here are both compromises that ostensibly relate to the need to reduce risky behaviours, but 
in reality do not.  The speed limit is a proxy for risk, a compromise designed to reflect the level of risk 
posed in certain circumstances in certain locations, but it can only ever be a guide when it does not 
change with the weather, or when an area is full of pedestrians or entirely without them. It also does 
not (indeed cannot) reflect the driving (dis)ability, mood, attitude or any other circumstances of the 
driver, nor the age of the vehicle, its state of (dis)repair, or its on-board technology. Speed limits have 
long been criticised for failing to reflect actual circumstances, with motorists even at the turn of the 
nineteenth century “argu[ing] there was no single ‘dangerous’ speed; it could be entirely safe to drive 
across Salisbury Plain at 50 mph, dangerous in the extreme to do more than 5 mph down Piccadilly. No 
general speed limit could cover all cases” (Plowden, 1971:17). Contemporary drivers have exhibited 
similar concerns when asked for their general views about speed cameras: 
 
Pat:  Eighty [miles per hour] in some situations is safer than thirty in others …  
Dave: Yeah, that’s true enough.  
Pat:  … and there’s a well-used saying that “there’s nothing wrong with speed so long as it’s 
used in the right place and at the right time”, and that’s quite true.’ (Professional driver focus 
group, project 1)  
 
‘I know there’s good reason for certain speed limits in certain areas but I mean there is also a 
good argument to suggest that speed limits, you know 24/7, is nonsense. Because O.K. 
outside a school 20mph, got no problem with that, but when its school holidays, why keep it 
at that level? Why not have sort of variability to do with time of day and congestion?’ (Male, 
mid 40s, convicted speeder focus group, project 1)   
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Those that find themselves cast as offenders by these laws may well therefore question the extent to 
which they have done ‘wrong’, or the extent to which other choices might have represented the ‘right’ 
choice.  
Likewise, the law relating to mobile phone use prohibits the use of a hand-held mobile phone but 
permits the use of a hands-free device that is, according to increasing amounts of research (Caird et 
al., 2008; Strayer et al., 2014), just as distracting and therefore just as likely to cause the harms that 
the law claims to be focussed upon. Therefore, just as speeds of 20mph may be dangerous in certain 
30mph limits (but are legal), and speeds of 80 mph may cause no discernible risk in some 
circumstances (but are illegal), drivers may find, for example, that their apparently safe mobile use in a 
stationary queue is illegal: 
‘I didn’t realise. I thought if you're stopped you're ok, so that was a big reality check for me, so 
since I've been on the course
1
 I've stopped using my phone like that, it wasn’t as bad as using 
your phone while you’re driving but it was still something.’ (Lucy, employee, project 2). 
 
‘One thing I was staggered about was when the policeman told us that they considered the 
highway to be hedgeway to hedgeway. So if you’re parked in a layby with the engine running 
you can actually still get in trouble for using your mobile phone and I’ve done that countless 
times where I’ve pulled in a layby, and I always thought I was doing the right thing.’ (Kevin, 
detected driver, project 2). 
 
Kevin is doing something potentially harmless as his car is stationary and out of the stream of traffic, 
but is acting illegally. If he were to drive off and continue the conversation on a hands-free kit he 
would be posing danger but would be acting within the law. Kevin is motivated by a desire to ‘do the 
right thing’ (an allusion to a presumed moral basis to the law) and yet still finds himself in trouble with 
the law. His story is similar to many speeding drivers who claimed that they had (for example) been 
caught driving at 38mph in what they thought was a 40mph limit but turned out to be a 30mph limit 
(Speed Awareness Course observations, project 1).  
                                                          
1
 Drivers detected using mobile phones whilst driving can, at present, be offered the chance to attend 
an educational course rather than receive a fixed penalty fine and points on their licence.  
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The law, it seems, simultaneously claims its legitimacy from risk, and exists in apparent denial of it. 
This means that, contrary to common sense perhaps, the law is a poor guide to what behaviour is safe 
– only to what is legal and drivers may have to choose which is the most important to them, within a 
context where they also are under pressure to choose the behaviour that is the most useful to them – 
that is, which allows them to compete or progress most successfully (Rosa, 2000: 63). In many cases, 
as shown, these three pressures cannot be accommodated in the same action so individuals are 
choosing which pressure is the most real and the least resistible every time they drive. With continual 
reminders of the importance of time and speed (Wajcman, 2015), and the need to develop and defend 
identity (Jenkins, 2008), coupled with both a decline in roads policing (House of Commons Transport 
Select Committee, 2016) and a contradiction between what is legal and what is safe, those actions that 
are deemed to be most useful in achieving desired outcomes in the short term may logically be 
preferred. 
A common feature of both projects was therefore drivers’ insistence that their law-breaking did not 
mean that they questioned their ‘law-abiding’ self-identity. In the circumstances outlined above, it is 
not easy to ‘do the right thing’ and, though unsettled by a brush with the law, drivers appeared to  
resist any inherent implications for their identity as a result of being accused of wrongdoing. Their 
defended identity was, it seems, based around other concerns and attributes than simply an 
adherence to the law: 
‘I have never been in trouble with the police in my life but now suddenly I’m a criminal? I am 
not. I am a hard-working, respectable citizen and a very responsible person.’ (Female, mid 50s, 
convicted driver focus group, project 1) 
 
‘I am a respectable upstanding member of this community and I object to being treated like a 
criminal’. (Female, late 50s, Speed Awareness Course, project 1). 
 
As such, other elements of the ‘respectable’ identity that do not use the law as a reference point are 
drafted in to challenge any unpleasant implications of legal problematisation. Mobile phone using 
offenders were similarly unsettled by the discovery that their good intentions were not enough to 
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insulate them from the attentions of the police, (as described by Kevin thinking he was ‘doing the right 
thing’, above), but that their law-abiding behaviour did not guarantee they were safe either.  
 
As the drivers above suggest, you cannot (or more accurately should not) ‘suddenly’ change from law-
abiding citizen to criminal just because enforcement activity has increased for a particular behaviour, 
even if that behaviour is against the criminal law (Corbett, 2003:25). It is, perhaps, no wonder that 
drivers may become disillusioned with the road traffic law, given that their choices appear to bear 
little relationship to the possible outcomes for them as ‘law-abiding’ drivers. What drivers seem to 
mean when they claim this identity is that by-and-large they are not bad people, they don’t routinely 
break laws, and they don’t intentionally wish to cause harm. But what action places them in the right 
category in this context is confusingly illusory.  
Perhaps the law, and some good intentions, would previously have been a good guide to what would 
allow you to proceed through life unhampered. Strict liability laws based on mens rea have an intuitive 
logic about them, but risk-based laws are increasingly mala prohibita, making it significantly easier to 
become an accidental offender (by misreading the speed limit, or by misunderstanding the subtleties 
of the law against ‘mobile phone’ ‘use’). Those laws are also demonstrably a compromise when they 
permit harmful behaviour and outlaw safe behaviour, perhaps encouraging us to believe that our 
decisions about when and what to obey can also reflect a need for compromise.  Debbie’s internal 
negotiation of what is acceptable has led her to cut out the ‘chatting’ and she now only allows herself 
to make ‘important’ calls whilst using her hands-free kit: 
‘I've made much fewer calls using my hands-free than I had before. I used to use it as, you 
know, if I've got 2 hours to drive to a meeting that's a good time to phone my mum because it 
will save me some time, that kind of thing, and I cut down on that a lot and thought actually I 
shouldn't really be on the phone at all, unless it's an important call. So I've really only made 
important calls using a hands-free kit since the course and only then brief, you know, “I'm 
going to be 10 minutes late” or that kind of thing, rather than phoning people using a hands-
free kit to chat.’ (Debbie, detected driver, project 2). 
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Similarly, drivers can claim ‘I only speed when it’s safe’ (male, late 20s, experienced driver focus group) 
and ‘I wouldn’t do it if it were dangerous’ (male, late 40s, Speed Awareness Course) – neither of which 
use the law as their basis for determining what is the right thing to do and what is not. When the law 
fails to reflect the danger it was claiming as its justification, perhaps we begin to feel that we have 
room to manoeuvre within it and negotiate with ourselves a set of acceptable and unacceptable 
actions that adhere to a personal set of rules, not the rules of the law itself. The following discussion 
considers what those ‘important’ calls might be, why they are important, and how they represent 
loyalties that conflict with loyalty to the law.  
 
Playing by the (other) rules  
Both research projects suggested that the law is, indeed, only one influence on people’s choice of 
behaviour. Drivers reported pressure to perform as a good employee, a good parent, a good partner – 
with such present and real influences seemingly competing quite effectively with the threat of 
enforcement of the road traffic law. Drivers described finding themselves in situations that required 
them to choose between useful but illegal behaviour, or legal behaviour that threatened their ability 
to compete, to perform, or to participate – choosing between being a law-abiding citizen and an 
alternatively constructed ‘good’ citizen of the acceleration society. 
For Keith, a foster parent to five children who were being temporarily looked after by another family, 
the identity of ‘responsible parent’ conflicted with that of ‘law-abiding driver’: 
‘I was running late because there were motorway repairs going on and it had taken me 
longer to get to Stoke-on-Trent than I expected… I'd got it on speaker though I couldn’t 
quite hear it and I lifted it to my ear and just then the policeman pulled up by the side of 
me and all I wanted to do of course was to tell these people that I was going to be half an 
hour, three quarters of an hour late.’ (Keith, detected driver, project 2).  
Rather than appearing to necessarily describe themselves as ‘law-abiding’, such individuals can instead 
be seen to reference other more immediately pressing aspects of their identity, which override 
commitment to safe choices and/or the law (which, as has been shown, are not necessarily 
coterminous): 
15 
 
‘I know you shouldn’t be doing it and I don’t do it, as a regular thing. I wouldn’t do it because 
I’ve got a hands-free kit but it hadn’t connected to my Bluetooth in my car and I was all a panic 
because I was that late picking my daughter up and she was 14 at the time and erm, I was just 
in a state anyway because I was late picking her up.’ (Rachel, detected driver, project 2) 
 
‘It’s like your brain has got two halves, you know that you should be safe but there are all sorts 
of things that, when you’re busy or you’re in a rush, you’ve got something else on your mind.’ 
(Jean, detected driver, project 2) 
 
These individuals describe themselves as trying to balance competing pressures. They are ‘signed-up’ 
to contemporary social expectations in a range of ways, as ‘good’ citizens, with obligations to a 
particular form of social contract that happens to exist in parallel to what the law dictates. For Kevin 
(below) speeding is a necessity in a time-poor existence – an opportunity to try to claw back some 
precious minutes, even seconds, to fulfil obligations to others: 
 ‘I think most offences, speeding especially, come down to time pressure. I don’t think it’s 
actually someone’s intention to put their foot down and speed. I don’t think there’s any thrill 
to driving your van at 90 miles per hour down the road… I think they do it because of time 
constraints that they’re trying to meet, deadlines, and trying to get through their working day.’ 
(Kevin, detected driver, project 2) 
 
Other UK research by Stradling et al. (2009:240) reported that 41% of drivers would speed when 
running late, with 19% reporting they would speed when their passenger was running late. In these 
cases it is clear that external pressures are responsible for some offences, with the expectations of 
others captured in the desire not to be personally late or to make others late. In trying to be good 
parents, good employees, good partners and good friends, and to achieve and maintain these aspects 
of the identity, drivers may find themselves driving that bit faster, reaching for their mobile to make 
that one call. In such circumstances, and at a time of decreased police patrols, the law takes a back 
seat. In these instances where the law and risk clash, the law becomes a risk in itself, as drivers 
reconsider the law in terms of how it can be less impactful upon their everyday accelerative needs, 
rather than the risk that was the original subject of the legislation (Wells, 2007). Rather than being 
viewed as a source of protection, the law becomes a threat as it tries to stand in the way of efforts to 
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present oneself as a productive citizen, responsible parent, or hard-working employee. It is therefore a 
contributor to ontological insecurity, rather than a stable reference point in efforts to resist it 
(Giddens, 1991). 
Kevin (above) was not alone in highlighting the particular pressure of obligations to employers 
specifically, and this is supported by research in this area. McKenna suggests that “for those who have 
been caught speeding at a high level and who were engaged in work related driving at the time of the 
offence…time pressure was quite important” (McKenna, 2005:99). Many employers were considered 
to be complicit in the criminalisation of their employees, setting targets and arranging schedules that 
were achievable only by breaking speed limits and then dismissing drivers who were caught: 
‘Mike: [W]e are under pressure to meet targets, and it’s difficult to get the company to reflect 
the target with the cameras and all that….[….] 
Pete: I don’t think they care, really. At our company they check our licences every six months, 
so on that basis they want to check if you’re legal. I don’t suppose they really care, really. if 
you’re banned, you’re banned. You’re a number. 
Ray: They just bring somebody else along. That’s all they do. (Professional driver focus group, 
project 1) 
 
For the above drivers speaking at the height of the campaign against speeding as part of the National 
Safety Camera Programme, the pressure of work manifested in specific pressure to speed to meet 
targets set by their employers or face dismissal at a time when employment markets were seen to be 
becoming increasingly insecure and competitive (Mythen, 2005). Some ten years later, in the mobile 
phone research (and see BBC news, 2016), it is not just those drivers that need to physically move 
themselves and their cargo around within increasingly tight schedules that feel the pressure of work 
expectations. As Simon comments, the time spent driving has been assimilated into the productive 
working day and is now a requirement for getting the job done: 
‘Not to use your mobile phones will be a stressful situation for a lot of people when they’re 
driving, and it will alter their work environment and a load of other things, so it will mean they 
will have to work longer hours, because a lot of people phone on their way home in the 
evenings, to finish off that last meeting, that last discussion, to get hold of that person they 
needed to, they are going to have to work an hour later or 40 minutes later.’ (Simon, employee, 
project 2).  
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Advances in technology have meant that more and more types of employment can be conducted on 
the move, and because they can, drivers sense a pressure that they should be – that being on the 
move was not an excuse for being unavailable: 
‘People just feel obliged when someone's calling them because, you know, it's quite a 
personal thing, if people call you to do business and you can't answer for two hours they'll say 
'I called you two hours ago, why haven't you called me back?' and if you say ‘well I've been 
driving for the last two hours’, they'll just go ‘well ok but I needed to speak to you.’ (Jamie, 
detected driver, project 2) 
 
Therefore, rather than freeing up time as it was supposed to (Keynes, 1933), technology creates 
increased expectation (Rosa and Scheuerman, 2009:8). Adeptly demonstrating the competing 
pressures of work and home life, Debbie (below) describes how she broke the law whilst trying to 
recapture her feelings of usefulness as a ‘good partner’ that she has lost by staying later at work in 
order to be a ‘good employee’: 
‘The day I got caught was the day I had been phoning my husband and my hands-free kit had 
conked out and I was just on the end of the call, 5 minutes from home just saying “do you 
want me to go to the chippy on the way home?” because I was late home from work.’ 
(Debbie, detected driver, project 2) 
 
As such, the conflicting demands of the (increasingly insecure and contingent) domestic and work 
spheres are being reconciled via the use of the mobile phone. Whereas she may previously have 
broken the speed limit to get home, Debbie can now call ahead and make her journey more useful; the 
takeaway is recompense for her decision to prioritise work over family. The vagaries of the 
(inconsistently enforced) law are a poor third to the need to balance these competing pressures.  
Rachel, on the other hand, was caught whilst trying to reassert her status as ‘good parent’ by 
responding to her daughter’s calls: 
‘I was late picking my daughter up, I’d forgotten what time it was, she was ringing and ringing 
and ringing me, “where are you, where are you?”  I knew I’d got 5 or 6 missed calls while I was 
driving so I literally went to pick the phone up off the seat to say I was on my way, you know, 
and that’s what happened, I got caught.’ (Rachel, detected driver, project 2). 
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Drivers often admitted to offending at times where the perceived benefits to life outweighed the 
potential risks. To be able to make it to a meeting on time, check up on the welfare of family members 
or inform an individual of late arrival were seen as acceptably valuable reasons to maintain the 
smooth order of life and risk adopting the offender behaviour. It appears that rather than obtaining 
any particular benefit from breaking the law, drivers are more preoccupied with avoiding dis-benefit – 
not being late, not being fired, preventing some from worrying, or missing a train. The dilemma is, of 
course, that these actions can result in prosecutions that make many of these things more likely, as in 
the following cases: 
‘If I get any more points I lose my licence and as a result will lose my job. Then I can’t pay the 
mortgage so my family will lose their home as well. I can’t see my wife putting up with that! 
It’s as simple as that!’ (Male, late 50s, professional driver focus group, project 1)  
 
The risks associated with a revoked licence were also understood in terms of reduced utility to the 
family, and even reduced worth as a person: 
 ‘[Losing my licence] would make me a burden on my friends and family. I couldn’t pull my 
weight with the kids any more. The wife would have to do it all, shopping, visiting, taking 
them to school and all that. I’d be no use at all.’ (Male, mid 40s, experienced driver focus 
group, project 1)  
 
‘That hits home, not just the repercussions of death, the injury, but the prison sentence, the 
fines, the cancellation of driving license which therefore can stop money, which sometimes is 
a bigger deterrent to people than “oh, you're gonna get, you might die”.’ (Carl, employee, 
project 2) 
 
Speeding, using a mobile, buying a camera detector, or investing in a hands-free kit that allow you to 
reap the benefits of offending, without exposing yourselves to the risks of enforcement, can all 
therefore be understood as actions taken to avoid variously construed ‘bads’ rather than to achieve 
the ‘goods’, as Beck so rightly identified as characteristic of the ‘risk society’ (1992). Whilst the act of 
speeding and using a mobile phone may protect against potential damage to individual identities, their 
enforcement (and the potential for accumulation of points leading to a driving ban) operates as a 
direct threat to performance on all those fronts. However, with reduced evidence of enforcement, and 
reduced consequences of being caught (a course, rather than fines and points for example), the 
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balance may tip in favour of taking that chance, and the law further drops down the list of relevant 
influences on driving behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
The slow, careful and bureaucratic process of the development of new law is, clearly, unable to 
respond to or reflect changes in technological capability that happen on a (seemingly) daily basis. As 
Rosa and Scheuerman (2009:12) note, the democratic state cannot hope to keep up with high-speed 
capitalism and, because legislation cannot keep up with the pace of change, it is possible that the law 
ceases to be a good guide to avoiding harmful behaviour. As they suggest if, as part of the process of 
acceleration, we see stable identity as having been replaced by more “open, experimental, and 
fragmentary images of the self” (ibid:11), then there becomes room for manoeuvre within concepts 
like ‘law-abidingness’ that speak to other masters than a commitment to the law – itself a rather out-
of-date and inflexible restriction on behaviour (in these cases particularly).  
Road death – the reality with which we began this paper - is sudden, brutal and violent. It is perhaps 
‘the’ mode of death for an accelerated society and yet it was conspicuously absent from much of this 
discussion. Whilst increasingly shown to be risk factors for harm on the roads, the risks of speeding 
and using a mobile are, it seems, understood primarily in terms of the risks posed by their illegality – 
curtailing the perceived potential benefits that these behaviours offer, and acting as a force for 
deceleration
2
.  
Given these conditions, assumptions about the impact of creating a law to reduce a certain behaviour 
can  be seen as having a somewhat myopic view of the context on which they are operating, assuming 
perhaps that it is the law (and what it allows and what it prohibits) that is front and centre for drivers 
as they make their journeys. Calls to ‘ban’ or ‘clamp down’ on certain behaviours or to ‘toughen up’ 
                                                          
2
 Whilst enforcement is perhaps understandably the foremost concern of those drivers who took part 
in the projects following detection, many of the participants had not been caught, for example the 
drivers receiving the education as part of their employment, and the drivers who took part in many of 
the focus groups. 
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penalties (see for example BBC news, 2016) exhibit a potentially misplaced faith in the power of laws 
to solve complex problems. Laws, education campaigns, levels and types of enforcement, are some of 
the factors that exert pressure, but so are expectations from beyond the road-using context - where 
the car and the journey may increasingly be seen as a vehicle for achieving other tasks above and 
beyond the basic process of getting from A to B. From this perspective it becomes apparent that ‘law-
abidingness’ is only one element of the identity that is relevant to road traffic law enforcement, which 
simultaneously confronts other key aspects of the fluid and reflexively constructed and defended post-
modern identity (Giddens, 1991; Mythen, 2005)
3
. Whilst it has been shown that knowledge of the law 
cannot be assumed, and therefore that not all drivers are necessarily aware that what they are doing is 
anything other than law-abiding, it can also be seen from these studies exploring mobile phone use 
whilst driving and speed limit infringements, that some drivers engage in the behaviours knowingly – 
in many cases when other pressures weigh more heavily on their conscience than the need to obey 
the law. This is potentially significant for efforts to persuade drivers of the need to conform to the law 
in order to bring about improvements in road safety. Such ‘compliance-based’ roads policing 
approaches also suffer when, as shown above, the law does not accurately reflect behaviours which 
do, or do not, cause harm. 
Increasingly based upon ‘risk’ thinking, rather than having the luxury of being mala in se, road traffic 
law seems unable to defend itself from other conceptualisations of ‘good’ness which are not premised 
on a starting point of being ‘law-abiding’. A mala prohibita law can easily be devalued by an apparently 
more moral obligation to being a ‘good’ parent, spouse or employee. Whilst many drivers referred to 
the law, and to their positioning of their identity in relation to it, this research suggests that the real 
influence on drivers, and the aspects of their identity that they deploy with most conviction, are those 
related to their other obligations in the accelerated world. The law was increasingly an inconvenience - 
                                                          
3
 The law is actually, perhaps, an example of where expectations based on past experience cease to be 
a useful guide to future action, or to what one can reasonably expect, as suggested above. 
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a threat to the strategies they used to negotiate modern life and a handbrake on their ability to 
compete.  
The act of driving is therefore subject to a range of influences, only one of which is the law. A driver 
who speeds or uses their hand-held mobile phone whilst driving may do so deliberately, or 
accidentally. They may do so believing that they are acting legally, or they may do so intentionally 
because they do not subscribe to the logic of the law. They may do so because other influences are 
more pressing, or because they do not believe that they are likely to get caught. They may do so 
because they believe that they will not cause harm, because they have never caused harm before. 
These concerns have implications for responses to risky road user behaviour - it seems that the law (or 
at least laws like these) have ceased to be a yardstick for demonstrating commitment to being a ‘good’ 
citizen for some. For others, who do continue to obey the law ‘because it is the law’, there is a need to 
ensure that the law accurately targets risky behaviours as they manifest in the ‘now’, not fifteen years 
ago, or potentially not (given the accelerated pace of technological development) even yesterday. For 
a third group, who obey the law because they fear prosecution, sufficient enforcement of the law is 
necessary to act as a deterrent strong enough to counter the many benefits that drivers continue to 
believe accrue from speeding and using their mobile phone whilst driving – from keeping up and 
keeping on. 
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